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THE "JENCKS RULE" IN NLRB PROCEEDINGS
REGINALD H. ALLEYNE, JR.*
During an unfair-labor-practice hearing before a trial examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board, the attorney for the General
Counsel of the NLRB concludes the direct examination of a witness
whose testimony is adverse to the respondent in the case' At this
point or at some time during cross-examination of the witness, respon-
dent's attorney requests that the attorney for the General Counsel
produce for respondent's inspection and for impeachment purposes
all written statements of the witness. It is the cross-examiner's inten-
tion to test the witness' credibility by revealing inconsistencies which
might exist between the witness' testimony on direct examination and
the contents of statements the witness might have given to agents
of the NLRB during the investigation of the charge leading to the
complaint and hearing in the case. To the extent that such incon-
sistencies can be shown to exist, the witness' credibility is open to
question. 2 Out of this hypothetically posed yet not untypical setting
* B.S., Tufts University, 1954; I.L.B., Howard University, 1959; Attorney, National
Labor Relations Board, Twenty-eighth Regional Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not intended as expres-
sions of view of the National Labor Relations Board or the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board.
1 The investigation of an alleged violation of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. 11 151-68 (1964), is initiated by filing an unfair-labor-practice charge with
the NLRB regional director for the region in which the alleged violation occurred. The
charge is investigated by the regional office. A charge found not to have merit is either
voluntarily withdrawn or dismissed by the regional director, subject to the right of appeal
to the General Counsel of the NLRB. If a charge is found to have merit, the regional
office attempts to settle the case. If settlement efforts are unsuccessful, the regional di-
rector institutes formal action by issuance of a complaint and notice of hearing. Absent
a prehearing settlement, a hearing on the unfair-labor-practice allegations is held before
a trial examiner of the NLRB. See National Labor Relations Board Statements of
Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §1 101.2-.10 (1968).
Ordinarily there are three parties to the hearing: the party filing the charge leading
to the complaint and hearing, the party alleged to have committed an unfair labor
practice, and the General Counsel of the NLRB who is represented by an attorney
attached to the Board's regional office and who has the responsibility of presenting the
evidence in support of the complaint. These parties are generally referred to as the
charging party, the respondent, and the General Counsel or attorney for the General
Counsel, respectively. They are sometimes so desginated herein.
2 On the subject of prior inconsistent statements, see generally 4 B. Jones, The Law
of Evidence 11 931-40 (5th ed. 1958); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence 1/ 1017-46 (3d ed. 1940).
Wigmore describes the use of prior inconsistent statements, in part as follows:
[I]nstead of invoking the assertions of other witnesses to prove [the testify-
ing witness'] specific error, we resort simply to the witness' own prior state-
ments, in which he has given a contrary version. We place his contradictory
statements side by side, and, as both cannot be correct we realize that in at
least one of the two he must have spoken erroneously. Thus, we have detected
him in one specific error, from which may be inferred a capacity to make other
errors.
Id. § 1017, at 685.
891
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
evolves the questions: What prehearing statements of witnesses in
NLRB proceedings must be produced for inspection and possible
impeachment attempts? And, assuming a statement is producible, at
what time and under what circumstances must the statement be
produced?
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1958, respondents at NLRB hearings were not permitted
to inspect a witness' signed pretrial statement for cross-examination
purposes? This practice, together with the absence of discovery pro-
cedures in the NLRB rules, rendered NLRB files essentially closed to
any kind of inspection' The denial of requests for pretrial statements
was based on Section 102.87 of the NLRB's Rules and Regulations,
which at that time prohibited the production of "files, documents,
reports, memoranda, or records of the Board . . . whether in answer
to subpena, subpena duces tecum or otherwise . . ." by agents of the
Board without the consent of the General Counsel or Chairman of
the NLRB? Although not expressly stated by the NLRB in any of
its decisions refusing disclosure of statements taken by NLRB agents,
3 NLRB v. Chambers Mfg. Corp., 278 F.2d 715, 46 L.R.R.M. 2316 (5th Cir. 1960),
enforcing 124 N.L.R.B. 721, 44 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1959) ; Reser Tanning Co. v. NLRB,
276 F.2d 80, 45 L.R.R.M. 3039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); Jamestown
Sterling Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 466, 32 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1953), enforced, 211 F.2d 725, 33
L.R.R.M. 2837 (2d Cir. 1954).
4 Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in part:
[National Labor Relations Board proceedings] shall, so far as practicable, be
conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district
courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district
courts of the United States adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.
29 U.S.C. § 160()) (1964). The language "relating to the 'rules of evidence' does not
require the Board to adopt the discovery procedure contemplated by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." See North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871,
67 L.R.R.M. 2603, 2606 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Reser Tanning Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d
80, 45 L.R.R.M. 3039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); NLRB v. Quest-,
Shon Mark Brassiere Co., 185 F.2d 285, 27 L.R.R.M. 2036 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 812 (1951). Cf. NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 66 L.R.R.M.
2136 (5th Cir. 1967), enforcing 153 N.L.R.B. 417, 59 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1965), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 955 (1968) (holding that NLRB trial examiners have discretion to grant or
deny a motion for leave to take depositions). 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1968) provides for
the taking of depositions "for good cause shown after the issuance of a complaint ...."
The NLRB has suggested that in a proper case, a request for pretrial discovery would
be granted. See Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 73 n.6 (1967). The
absence of discovery provisions in the NLRB's rules and regulations has been held not to
be a denial of due process of law. NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751, 29
L.R.R.M. 2319, 2321 (9th Cir. 1951); Red Bird Foods, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 89, 64
L.R.R.M. 1127 (1967); Plumbers Local 100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 46 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1960),
291 F.2d 927, 48 L.R.R.M. 2544 (5th Cir. 1961). Contra, NLRB v. Southern Materials
Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244, 59 L.R.R.M. 2220, 2223-24 (4th Cir. 1965) (dictum).
5 Section 102.87, NLRB Rules and Regulations, Series 6, originally promulgated as
§ 102.90, 16 Fed. Reg. 1934, 1947-48 (1951).
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those decisions and rule 102.87 were based apparently on the theory
that witnesses interviewed by NLRB agents during the investigation
of unfair-labor-practice charges would be more inclined to give state-
ments and to speak freely in the knowledge that their written state-
ments would not be revealed to an adverse party. No firm legal basis
existed for challenging the NLRB's policy of not making prehearing
statements available for cross-examination purposes until the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States.° In the
Jencks decision the Supreme Court dealt squarely with the issue of
the Government's right to suppress information which might be vital
to an accused's defense in a criminal case.
The case arose out of a criminal prosecution for filing a false
non-Communist affidavit with the NLRB. 7 At the trial, government
witnesses who were paid informers for the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation testified that during their employment with the FBI they sub-
mitted written reports to the FBI concerning the defendant's attend-
ance at Communist Party meetings. At the conclusion of their testimony
on direct examination, defense counsel moved for an order directing
an inspection of those reports by the defense. The motions were denied
and the defendant was subsequently found guilty.' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that at the
trial the defendant had laid no preliminary foundation of inconsis-
tency between the contents of the reports to the FBI and the testimony
of the government witness informers who made the reports.° The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the petitioner was entitled to
an order directing the Government to produce for inspection all re-
ports of [the witnesses] in its possession, written and, when orally
made, as recorded by the F.B.I. touching the events and activities as
to which they testified at the trial."'° The rationale of the court of
appeals, requiring a showing of inconsistency between the requested
document and the witness' testimony, was specifically rejected on the
ground that it was "clearly incompatible with our standards for the
administration of criminal justice . . . ."" Resolving in favor of the
6 353 U.S. 657 (1956).
7 The prosecution in Jencks was under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964) providing criminal
penalties for making false statements to a department or agency of the federal govern-
ment. At that time, § 9(h) of the NLRA provided that the processes of the NLRB were
to be unavailable to a labor organization "unless there is on file with the Board an affi-
davit executed .. . by each officer of such labor organization . . that he is not a
member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party ...." 29 U.S.C. § 159(h)
(1958). This section has since been repealed. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
8 353 U.S. at 659.
9 226 F.2d 540, 37 L.R.R.M. 2015 (5th Cir. 1955). This holding was consistent
with then existing law. Cf. Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
lo 353 U.S. at 668.
11 Id.
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defendant the conflicting interests of the Government in suppressing
the FBI report and the defendant in using the report for cross-exami-
nation purposes, the Court noted the overriding value to the defense
of demonstrating prior inconsistent statements of an adverse witness.
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows
the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the wit-
ness recording the events before time dulls treacherous mem-
ory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and
the version of the events given in his reports is not the only
test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts
related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same
facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to
the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a
witness' trial testimony?'
Although not expressly stated in Jencks, the Supreme Court
subsequently noted that the decision was an exercise of the Court's
power to prescribe procedures for the administration of justice in
the federal courts and was not grounded on the Constitution."
II. THE NLRB AND THE JENCKS DECISION
In Great Ml. & Pac. Tea Co.,14 the NLRB held that the Jencks
holding was limited to criminal cases, stating that its application to
NLRB proceedings would seem "to amount to a pro tanto repeal of
Section 102.87 without showing a need therefor."" The NLRB rea-
soned that the Executive Department's "Housekeeping" Act" author-
ized the promulgation of rule 102.87, and that Section 6 of the National
Labor Relations Act,n authorizing the Board to make rules and regu-
12 Id. at 667.
13 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 257-58 (1961); Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959). But see Keefe, Jinks and Jencks, 7 Cath. U.L. Rev. 91, 92
(1958) ; see also Palermo v. United States, Supra at 362-63 (Brennan, J. concurring).
14 118 N.L.R.B. 1280,40 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1957).
15 Id. at 1283, 40 L.R.R.M. at 1340. Accord, E.V. Prentice Mach. Works, Inc., 120
N.L.R.B. 1691 n.1, 42 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1958); Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
1521, 42 L.R.R.M. 1215 (1958); Local 450, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, 120 N.L.R.B. 568,
42 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1958) ; Building & Constr. Trades Council, 119 N.L.R.B. 1816, 1817
n.1, 41 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1958).
16 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). The Act provides: "The head of each department is
authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his
department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to it." This section has since been amended by the addition of the sentence:
"This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting
the availability of records to the public." 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
17 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964) provides: "The Board shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative




lations, specifically conferred jurisdiction upon the NLRB to adopt
that rule. The Board's reasoning was not persuasive. Its authority to
adopt rule 102.87 was not in question. The issue was whether, in light
of the Jencks decision, fundamental fairness required the adoption of
a different rule. Certainly the broad language in the "Housekeeping"
Act did not preclude the NLRB from exercising its discretion under
Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act to enact a rule consistent
with Jencks." The real issue in Great Atlantic, and one which the
NLRB did not discuss in the case, was whether, on balance, the in-
terests of respondents in Board proceedings in obtaining statements
for purposes of impeachment outweighed the interests of the NLRB in
not revealing the contents of such statements.
In a later case, Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp.," the NLRB at first again
declined to adopt Jencks, but subsequently reconsidered that decision
and adopted Jencks" because of an intervening court decision in
NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp. 2 ' There, the court held the Jencks
principle applicable to an NLRB proceeding and refused to enforce
an NLRB order because the trial examiner denied the respondent's
request for production of a written prehearing statement by a witness
for the General Counsel. The court's sole basis for holding Jencks
applicable to NLRB proceedings was that "logic" compelled that
result,22 citing Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd." and Walling v. Twyeffort, Inc."
The Communist Party case was the first case in which a court
extended the Jencks decision to an administrative proceeding. There,
the statement denied production was an FBI agent's report of an
interview with a government witness in a Subversive Activities Control
Board proceeding to determine whether the Communist Party should
register as a "Communist-action" or "Communist-front" organization
within the meaning of the Subversive Activities Control Act. 25 Moving
from the premises that SACB proceedings are neither criminal nor
civil, but "administrative," that in both criminal and civil proceedings
18 See note 16 supra.
is 120 N.L.R.B. 503, 42 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1958).
23 Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 42 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1958).
21 258 F.2d 403, 42 L.R.R.M. 242 (2d Cir. 1958); 57 Mich. L. Rev. 420, 421
(1959).
22 258 F.2d at 408.
23 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24 158 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1947). This was an action in a federal district court to
enjoin an employer from violating the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. At the trial, defendants asked that a signed statement of a witness for the com-
plaining party be produced. The court refused to order production on the ground that
the statement was confidential. The court of appeals held that the refusal to order pro-
duction was harmless error.
25 50 U.S.C. §§ 782 (3 ), (4), 786 (1964).
895
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the report would have been producible, 22 and that "`the laws under
which [administrative] agencies operate prescribe the fundamentals
of fair play,'"27
 the court held that the denial of the motion to produce
was error.
Although proceedings before the SACB are not criminal, there is a
close connection between possible criminal prosecution and an adverse
order of the SACB requiring an organization to register as a "Com-
munist-action" or "Communist-front" organization. Several criminal
proscriptions are imposed by the Subversive Activities Control Act
upon members of an organizatidn which registers or has been ordered
to register pursuant to an SACB decision, 28
 thus making SACB pro-
ceedings, though administrative, criminal in nature to the extent that
the SACB operates as a link in the administration of a criminal statute.
Rather than rely upon civil proceedings generally as an analogy, a
better rationale in extending Jencks to the SACB in the Communist
26 According to the reasoning of the court, the report would have been producible
in criminal cases under the Jencks decision, and in civil cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
This rule provides for the production of documents "not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination per-
mitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in [any party's] possession, custody, or control
. . ." Id. The related portion of rule 26(b) allows examination of "any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party . . . ." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(6).
The court's analogy to civil cases does not appear to be appropriate in light of
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 US. 495 (1947), holding that absent "hardship," discovery may
not be had of oral or written statements by witnesses taken by the attorney employed
to prosecute or defend the case. See Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 865
(1961), concluding that the Hickman and Jencks decisions are diametrically opposite. Nor
can the analogy to civil cases be justified solely on the basis of a distinction between
statements taken by attorneys and those taken by nonattorney government investigators,
since the Hickman doctrine has been extended to include agents of a party, whether at-
torneys or not. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert, denied, 339
US, 967 (1950). •
27 254 F.2d at 327, quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940).
28 E.g., 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1964), which makes it unlawful for members of a registered
organization, or one designated as having to register, to seek, accept or hold employment
under the United States or to fail to disclose their membership in such organizations
when so seeking, accepting or holding employment under the United States. If the organi-
zation is designated a "Communist-action organization," that section makes it unlawful
for such organization members to engage in any employment in a defense facility or to
hold office or employment with any labor organization within the meaning of § 2(5) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1964), or to represent any employer in any matter or
proceeding arising or pending under the NLRA. In addition, the failure to register when
ordered to do so by the SACB carried heavy criminal penalties. Under § 15(a) (2) of
the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2) (1964) for example, each day of failure to register con-
stituted a separate offense punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or five years im-
prisonment or both. The question on the merits in the case is now academic. In Albert-
son v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965), the Supreme Court held
that the registration requirements of the Subversive Activities Control Act violated the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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Party case would have been the close nexus between SACB orders and
the potential criminal consequences arising out of the Subversive
Activities Control Act.
Carrying the decision in the Communist Party case to its logical
conclusion would result in the application of the Jencks principle to
all administrative proceedings, irrespective of the degree to which the
administrative proceeding is adversary in nature, and the degree to
which penalties might be imposed upon a party, following an adverse
finding by an agency. Viewing the Adhesive Products decision in light
of the nature of the agency's proceedings, on the other hand, the de-
cision to apply Jencks to the NLRB was an extension of the court's
holding in the Communist Party case. In NLRB proceedings, unlike
SACB proceedings, there is no direct connection between an order
adverse to a respondent and possible criminal Consequences arising
out of the statute governing the proceedings. Examined in terms of the
penal nature of an agency's order, the decision was sound, inasmuch
as the NLRB has broad powers to remedy violations of the National
Labor Relations Act, including back-pay awards in appropriate cases."
In addition, there are varying degrees of underlying economic con-
sequences incident to remedial orders issued by the NLRB on a finding
of an unfair labor practice as defined by the National Labor Relations
Act."
Although, as a result of the NLRB's second Ra-Rich decision,"
it was settled that NLRB files were not sacrosanct, sharp questions
continued to arise in NLRB proceedings concerning the types of
pretrial statements subject to production, the timing of the request
for production, and how such statements, once obtained, could be used
by the cross-examiner. At one end of the spectrum are blanket requests
for all statements taken during the NLRB's investigation of a case.
These requests are denied. They are in effect requests for pretrial
discovery and the NLRB's rules and regulations do not now contain
provisions for discovery." At the other end of the spectrum are specific
requests for statements made by a specific witness. Such requests may
or may not be granted, depending upon the timing of the request and
the type of statement sought. Following the second Ra-Rich decision,
these matters were made the subject of Section 102.118 of the NLRB's
Rules and Regulations when a proviso was added to the language pro-
hibiting disclosure of the contents of NLRB files without the consent
29 Section 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 	 160(c) (1964), authorizes the NLRB
to fashion remedies for violations of the Act, including the award of back pay in ap-
propriate cases. See generally Fuchs & Kelleher, The Back-Pay Remedy of the National
Labor Relations Board, 9 I3.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 829 (1968).
30 Unfair labor practices are defined in § 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (1964).
31 Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 42 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1958).
32 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1968). See also authorities cited note 4 supra.
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of the General Counsel or Chairman of the NLRB. The proviso reads
as follows:
Provided, After a witness called by the general counsel has
testified in a hearing upon a complaint under section 10(c)
of the act, the respondent may move for the production of
any statement of such witness in possession of the general
counsel, if such statement has been reduced to writing and
signed or otherwise approved or adopted by the witness. Such
motion shall be granted by the trial examiner. If the general
counsel declines to furnish the statement, the testimony of
the witness shall be stricken: Provided further, That after
any witness has testified in any postelection hearing pursuant
to § 102.69(d), any party may move for the production of
any statement of such witness in possession of any agent
of the Board, if such statement has been reduced to writing
and signed or otherwise approved by the witness. Such motion
shall be granted by the hearing officer.33
M. THE NLRB AND THE JENCKS ACT
The proviso to section 102.118 was patterned generally after the
Jencks Act," which was enacted by Congress in 1957 in order to
33 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1968).
34 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The act, in pertinent part, provides:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no state-
ment or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the de-
fendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpena,
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate
to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order
it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced
under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to
deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such
delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material
excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant
for his use....
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court
under paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such State-
ment, or such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless
the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require
that a mistrial be declared.
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"clarify" the Jencks decision. The Act provides that a criminal de-
fendant's right to inspect government files is limited to situations
where the witness whose statement is sought has testified for the
Government on direct examination and where the statement relates
to the subject matter of the witness' testimony." The Act further
provides that if the defendant's motion for production is resisted by
the Government on the ground that the requested statement does not
contain matters which relate to the subject matter of the testimony
of the witness, "the court shall order the United States to deliver such
statement for the inspection of the court in camera." 36
 The statute
commands the court to remove any portions of the statement which
do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.
The revised statement is then delivered to the defendant for his use.
If the Government elects not to comply with an order of the court
to deliver the statement to the defendant, "the court shall strike from
the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed
unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of
justice require that a mistrial be declared."" The Jencks Act defines
a "statement" as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or
otherwise adopted or approved by him; or
35 In the main, the legislation was passed because some lower courts had erroneously
interpreted the Jencks decision as giving criminal defendants a broad right of discovery
in criminal cases. But the number and nature of such decisions was greatly exaggerated.
See Note, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 308-09 (1959) ;
Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 681-83
(1958). The Senate Committee reporting on the bill which became the Jencks Act said:
The proposed legislation, is not designed to nullify, or to curb, or to limit
the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process is concerned. The com-
mittee believes that legislation would clearly be unconstitutional if it sought to
restrict due process. On the other hand, the proposed legislation, as here pre-
sented, reaffirms the decision of the Supreme Court in its holding that a de-
fendant on trial in a criminal prosecution is entitled to relevant and compe-
tent reports and statements in possession of the Government touching the
events and activities as to which a Government witness has testified at the
trial, but excluding such matter which is within any valid exclusionary rule.
. . .
. The committee is of the opinion, and the bill so provides, that state-
ments of witnesses should not be subject to production until the Government
witness, who is the putative source of such statements, has himself testified.
In other words, it is the specific content of the bill to provide for the produc-
tion of statements, reports, transcriptions or recordings, as described in the bill,
after the Government witness has testified against the defendant on direct
examination in open court, and to prevent disclosure before such witness has
testified. The committee is also of the opinion that the decision as to relevance
must be made by the trial judge and not by the defendant or his attorney.
S. Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reported in 2 U.S. Code, Cong. &
Ad. News 1861, 1862-63 (1957). See also Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 356
(1959) (summarizing in part the legislative history of the Jencks Act).
36 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1964).
37 Id. § 3500(d).
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(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other record-
ing, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said wit-
ness to an agent of the Government and recorded con-
temporaneously with the making of such oral state-
ments'
.The NLRB indicated that it would look to the Jencks Act as
well as the Jencks decision in considering the application of rule
102.118." But neither the letter of that rule nor NLRB decisions in-
terpreting it were entirely consistent with the tenor of the Jencks Act.
The rule followed the Jencks Act requirement that a producible state-
ment be written, signed, or otherwise adopted or approved by the
witness whose statement was sought; the rule, at that time, did not
adopt the "substantially verbatim-contemporaneously recorded" pro-
vision which the Jencks Act sets out as an alternative to the "signed-
approved-or-adopted" test." The Jencks Act requires that the re-
quested statement relate to the subject matter of the witness'
testimony; NLRB rule 102.118 contained no such requirement. Both
the Jencks Act and the rule apply only to documents in the Govern-
ment's possession, but the courts and the NLRB have in some instances
differed on the question of the physical scope of the possession require-
ment.
Prompted in part by courts which disagreed with the NLRB's
failure to adopt the Jencks Act's section (e) (2) "substantially ver-
batim-contemporaneously recorded" definition of a statement's the
NLRB on July 9, 1968, amended the proviso to rule 102.118 to make
it consistent with the tenor of the entire Jencks Act, including Section
88 Id. §§ 3500(e) (1), (2).
80 See, e.g., United States Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 n.1, 58 L.R.R.M. 1557
(1965) ; Canton Cotton Mills, 148 N.L.R.B. 464, 465 n.1, 57 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1964).
In Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), and Rosenberg v. United States, 360
U.S. 367 (1959), the Supreme Court held that since the enactment of the Jencks Act,
the Act "and not the Jencks decision governs the production of statements of govern-
ment witnesses for a defendant's inspection at trial." Id. at 369.
40 E.g., United States Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 709, 58 L.R.R.M. 1557 (1965) ;
Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 55, 64 n.27, 52 L.R.R.M. 1545
(1963).
41 NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 278, 66 L.R.R.M. 2136,
2139-40 (5th Cir. 1967), enforcing 153 N.L.R.B. 417, 59 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1965), cert.
denied, 390 US. 955 (1968) ; NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974,
981, 64 L.R.R.M. 2210, 2215 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335
F.2d 749, 753-54, 56 L.R.R.M. 2982, 2984-85 (9th Cir. 1964).
In Harvey Aluminum, the court noted that, although the trial examiner did not
restrict NLRB rule 102.118 to the "signed, approved or adopted" standard, testimony
by the attorney for the General Counsel on the question of the existence of producible
statements may have been so restricted, and that "rainy doubt that exists on this
score can be resolved readily on remand." Id. at 756, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2986.
900
"JENCKS RULE"
(e) (2) of the Act."' Also, the amended proviso, like the Jencks Act,
provides for an in camera inspection by the trial examiner when the
question of a statement's relevancy to a witness' testimony on direct
examination is raised by the Government's
The amended proviso is of course adapted to the administrative
procedures used by the NLRB in conducting hearings. Unlike the
Jencks Act, it provides that the General Counsel will preserve any
statement or portion of a statement refused production by the trial
examiner after the trial examiner's in camera inspection. The preserved
statement is made available to the NLRB if exceptions are taken to
42 33 Fed. Reg. 9819 (July 9, 1968).
(b) (1) Notwithstanding the prohibitions of paragraph (a) of this section,
after a witness called by the general counsel or by the charging party has testi-
fied in a hearing upon a complaint under section 10(c) of the act, the trial
examiner shall, upon motion of the respondent, order the production of any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of such witness in the possession of the gen-
eral counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness, the trial examiner shall order it to be
delivered directly to the respondent for his examination and use for the purpose
of cross-examination. 	 •
(2) If the general counsel claims that any statement ordered to be produced
under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness, the trial examiner shall order the general
counsel to deliver such statement for the inspection of the trial examiner in
camera. Upon such delivery the trial examiner shall excise the portions of such
statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the
witness. With such material excised the trial examiner shall then direct delivery
of such statement to the respondent for his use on cross-examination. If, pur-
suant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the
respondent and the respondent objects to such withholding, the entire text of
such statement shall be preserved by the general counsel, and, in the event the
respondent files exceptions with the Board based upon such withholding, shall
be made available to the Board for the purpose of determining the correctness
of the ruling of the trial examiner. If the general counsel elects not to comply
with an order of the trial examiner directing delivery to the respondent of any
such statement, or such portion thereof as the trial examiner may direct, the
trial examiner shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness.
(c) The provisions of paragraph (b) of this section shall also apply after
any witness has testified in any postelection hearing pursuant to 	 102.69(d)
and any party has moved for the production of any statement (as hereinafter
defined) of such witness in possession of any agent of the Board which relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. The authority exer-
cised by the trial examiner under paragraph (b) of this section shall be exer-
cised by the hearing officer presiding.
(d) The term "statement" as used in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section means: (1) A written statement made by said witness and signed or
otherwise adopted or approved by him; or (2) a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the
party obligated to produce the statement and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement.
Id. at 9820.
43 Id. (§ (b)).
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the trial examiner's refusal to order production." The amended proviso
applies to statements of witnesses for the charging party, as well to
statements of witnesses for the General Counsel.'
The NLRB will unquestionably look to the courts for some
guidance in interpreting those Jencks Act provisions which were added
to the NLRB's rules by the amended proviso. This will necessarily
create new areas of litigation in NLRB proceedings. Courts, including
the Supreme Court, have not always ruled with consistency or unan-
iminity on questions involving interpretation of the Jencks Act.
• A. Timeliness of Production Requests
The main thrust of the Jencks Act is to impose clear, statutory
limits upon a criminal defendant's right to inspect government files.
It is mandatory that the request, if otherwise appropriate, be invoked
"[a] fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination . . .”" To this extent, NLRB rule 102.118 has been
consistent with the Jencks Act since the second Ra-Rich decision. The
rule is applicable where otherwise appropriate, "after a witness called
by the general counsel has testified . . . .”" Like the Jencks Act, the
purpose of the rule in this respect is to limit narrowly the right of
production to impeachment attempts on cross-examination and not
to confer a general right of discovery." The NLRB strictly adheres
to this provision, and approves trial examiners' denials of production
requests which are made before a witness whose statement is sought
has commenced or completed his direct examination," and those made
after a witness has been cross-examined and excused." In the case of
requests for production made after a witness has been cross-examined
44 Id.
45 Id.
96 18 U.S.C. 	 3500(6) (1964); Johnston v. United States, 260 F.2d 345, 347
(10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959).
47 33 Fed. Reg. 9820 (July 9, 1968).
48 See Nachman Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 473, 474 n.1, 54 L.R.R.M. 1402 (1963) ;
Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1098 n.1, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1453 (1961).
49 NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 47 L.R.R.M. 2670 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); NLRB v. Chambers Mfg. Corp., 278 F.2d 715, 46
L.R.R.M. 2316 (5th Cir. 1960); Local 320, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, 150 N.L.R.B. 455,
456 n.2, 58 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1114 (1964). See Aero Corp., 149 N.L.R.B 1283, 1288, 57
L.R.R.M. 1483, 1490-91 (1964) (denying a production request for pretrial statements
made by persons who purportedly signed union authorization cards, the request having
been made during the cross-examination of a handwriting expert who testified on
direct examination as a witness for the General Counsel). Cf. United States v. David, 168
F. Supp. 269 (ND. Ohio 1958), aff'd per curiam, 264 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 967 (1959).
59 Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 46 L.R.R.M. 1535
(1960), enforced per curiam, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961). See Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp.,
172 N.L.R.B. No. 81,68 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1968).
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and excused, the Board reasons that a contrary rule would disorganize
the hearing.' This somewhat restrictive application of the rule is to
some extent mollified by the discretion vested in the trial examiner
to permit the recall of a witness for additional cross-examination. 52
Under that circumstance, a respondent would not be barred from mak-
ing a production request solely for the reason that no request had been
made before the conclusion of his initial cross-examination of the
witness.53
Since the rule, like the Jencks Act, is a procedural device which
permits a respondent to establish prior inconsistent statements of
adverse witnesses, its restriction to periods of time following the direct
examination of the witness sought to be impeached is warranted; the
restriction of the rule's operation to periods of time before the com-
pletion of cross-examination, though less\justifiable, does not appear
to be unreasonable. The cross-examiner has the burden of establishing
the existence of statements given to government agents, and this is
ordinarily done by eliciting from a witness during cross-examination
the fact that such statements were made. Thus, the initial cross-
examination of the witness is clearly the proper time to bring out these
matters.
If the respondent recalls a previously cross-examined witness as
his own witness, a production attempt may not be made, since the
witness in that instance is not being cross-examined. If a respondent
calls an adverse witness under Rule 43 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," respondent is entitled to interrogate the witness by
"leading questions and [to] contradict and impeach him in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party . . . ." Rule 43 (b) would
appear thus to warrant a production order on respondent's request
when respondent's witness is testifying as an adverse rule 43(b) wit-
ness. But the NLRB holds to the contrary, and has denied a produc-
tion request made under those circumstances. 55
51 Id. at 296, 46 L.R.R.M. at 1535.
52 Cf. id.
53 Id.
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(b) provides:
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions.
A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent
of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is
an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and
the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of
the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only
upon the subject matter of his examination in chief.
cc Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910, 911 n.2, 57 L.R.R.M. 1395,
1396 (1964).
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B. Statements Within the Scope o f the
Jencks Act and the NLRB's Jencks Rule
In addition to limiting narrowly the time within which a pro-
duction request may be made, the Jencks Act also places limits upon
the types of statements which are producible. These limitations are
cast within the framework of the definition of a statement in Sections
(e) (1) and (2) of the Act." A written statement signed by the witness
poses no problems, and is clearly within section (e) (1). There have
been difficulties, however, in determining what constitutes a section
(e) (I) "adopted or approved" statement and what constitutes a sec-
tion (e) (2) "substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement. . . .
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement."'
1. Adoption-Approval.—Like its counterpart in the Jencks Act, the
approval or adoption requirement of the NLRB's inspection rule
forecloses a gap which would exist if the rule or the statute unqual-
ifiedly required that every statement subject to production be signed
by the witness whose statement is sought. The words "signed or other-
wise adopted or approved," as used in subsection (d) (1) of the
amended proviso and in the Jencks Act, contemplate that an unsigned
statement may not be denied production solely on the ground of lack
of a signature. 58
 In the absence of a signature, an otherwise producible
statement falls within Section (e) (1) of the Jencks Act and subsection
(d) (1) of the amended proviso if the statement taken is read by or
to the witness and its accuracy is acknowledged in some way by that
witness."
In Campbell v. United States," decided by a divided Supreme
Court, section (e) (1) was given the broadest possible interpretation.
In that case, a prosecution for bank robbery, an FBI agent took notes
while interviewing a witness to the robbery. He referred to the notes
and recited to the witness the substance of the witness' account, and
received the witness' assurance that the statement was accurate. Seven
hours after confronting the witness, the agent dictated the report into
a dictating machine, using his notes of the interview and also relying
upon his memory. The agent then destroyed his interview notes. The
report was transcribed, but the transcription was never shown to the
so 18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(e) (1), (2) (1964).
57 Id. § 3500(e) (2).
88 Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 96-98 (1961). Four justices, dissenting
in part, thought that § (e) (1) applied only to statements in the witness' handwriting. Id.
at 104-06. The legislative history of the Act supports the majority. See H.R. Rep.
No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). NLRB rule 102.118 is clearer in this regard, and
is not as susceptible of an interpretation that it applies only to statements in the hand-
writing of the witness.
88 NLRB Rule 102.118.
eo 373 U.S. 487 (1963).
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witness. The district judge, after the original remand," held that
neither the notes nor the interview report was producible under the
Jencks Act." The court of appeals held that the status of the notes
could not be determined adequately without more testimony from
the witness who had given the statement, and accordingly ordered a
special hearing before another district judge." That judge found that
the witness adopted the narrative as recited by the FBI agent and
that the transcribed interview report "was almost in ipsissima verba
the narrative" which the agent had recited to the witness." On the
basis of those findings, the Supreme Court concluded that the tran-
scribed statement of the FBI agent was producible as an "approved
or adopted" statement within the meaning of the Jencks Act. 65
The Campbell case, which is an important one in terms of its
relationship to day-to-day factual situations arising out of the invest-
igation of criminal cases, appears to have been incorrectly decided.
The statement which the witness "adopted or approved" was destroyed
and the question of its producibility was not considered by the Supreme
Court. The transcribed statement clearly did not qualify as a "signed"
statement. Section (e) (1) of the Jencks Act contains nothing relating
to the "transcription" of an "adopted or approved" statement, much
less one transcribed partly from an agent's memory several hours after
an interview. If Congress, in enacting the Jencks Act, had intended to
include transcriptions of "adopted or approved" statements within
the scope of section (e)( 1 ), its intent would probably have been made
as clear as it was in section (e) ( 2 ) where transcriptions of certain
recordings are expressly made a part of the "substantially verbatim-
contemporaneously recorded" definition of a statement. Further, it is
unlikely that the interests of ascertaining truth in judicial proceedings
will be advanced by permitting a party to demonstrate inconsistencies
between a witness' testimony and statements like the one held pro-
ducible in the second Campbell case. Assuming, as one must, the
fallibility of the FBI agent's memory, if his transcribed statement did
not accurately reflect the witness' narration to him—and the dissenting
justices thought that it did not—the value of testing credibility by
comparing a witness' testimony with such a statement is necessarily
61 Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
62 United States v. Campbell, 206 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mass..1961).
63 Campbell v. United States, 296 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1961).
64 United States v. Campbell, 199 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Mass. 1961).
65 Three Justices—Clark, Harlan and Stewart—dissented on the ground that the
record did not support the trial judge's finding that the agent's interview report and his
earlier narrative to the witness were the same, and that even if they were, "the statute
does not cover a written report . . . prepared from the agent's memory, as well as his
notes, some nine hours subsequent to the interview and neither read by or to the
witness nor shown to him prior to what the Court terms his 'adoption' of it." 373
U.S. at 499.
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lost. In any event, if a transcription of an "adopted or approved"
statement was not intended to be within section (e) (1), it was not
material in Campbell whether the transcription and the earlier narra-
tion to the witness were the same.
In Canton Cotton Mills," one of the few NLRB cases dealing
with the reach of the "approval or adoption" aspect of NLRB rule
102.118, and where the facts differed substantially from those in
Campbell, the attorney for the General Counsel of the NLRB had
prepared a pretrial summary of a witness' affidavit in the form of ques-
tions and answers. The question and answer summary was not shown
to or discussed with the witness before trial. The statements in the
witness' affidavit and the answers written out in the question and
answer summary were the same. On request of the respondent's
counsel, a copy of the witness' affidavit was furnished the respondent
for his inspection and use in cross-examination. The respondent then
successfully moved for the production of the question and answer
summary. The NLRB held that under the circumstances the question
and answer summary was not a statement "approved or adopted"
by the witness within the meaning of section 102.118 of the NLRB
rules "or the principles enunciated in Jencks v. United States . . . or
the 'Jencks Act,' " and that the trial examiner improperly ordered the
summary's production."
The statement in the Canton case was clearly not within the
scope of rule 102.118. Since the witness had no way of knowing
the contents of the summary, it could hardly have been considered
"approved or adopted" by the witness. Nor would the statement in
Canton qualify as producible under Section (e)(2) of the Jencks Act,
or its counterpart in subsection (d) (2) of the amended proviso, since
it was not made contemporaneously with the witness' interview, as
those sections require, but after the interview and on the basis of
another statement.
In a related but distinguishable case decided before the NLRB's
amendment of the proviso, an NLRB trial examiner dendied production
of a question and answer form which had been completed during the
interview of a witness." The denial was based on the fact that the form
had not been signed by the witness. It is not clear from the decision
whether the witness had occasion to "approve or adopt" the contents
of the form. Under the Jencks Act and the amended proviso, the corn-
66 148 N.L.R.B. 464,57 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1964).
67 Id. at 465 n.1, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1035. The Board held further that the trial
examiner's error in ordering production of the question and answer summary was not
prejudicial, inasmuch as several other witnesses corroborated the testimony of the wit-
ness involved. Id.




pleted form might have been producible, since the statement was taken
contemporaneously with the interview and the answers might have
been substantially verbatim recordings of the witness' narration, thus
bringing the form within the scope of Section (e) (2) of the Act and
subsection (d) (2) of the amended proviso.
2. Substantially Verbatim-Contemporaneous Recordings.—In a crim-
inal proceeding in a federal district court, a statement not "signed,
approved or adopted" within the meaning of Section (e) (1) of the
Jencks Act might nonetheless be subject to production under section
(e) (2 ) as a "substantially verbatim-contemporaneously recorded"
recital of a witness' oral statement. As a result of the amended proviso,
this is now true in NLRB proceedings. To qualify as a statement under
this definition a statement must meet both the substantially verbatim
and the contemporaneous recording tests. More so than the "approval
or adoption" test contained in both the Jencks Act and rule 102.118,
the "substantially verbatim-contemporaneously recorded" standard is
inherently susceptible of a wide range of construction problems. Similar
problems will confront the NLRB now that the agency has followed
the judicial trend to engraft that test upon the NLRB. Although no
firm definition has evolved from Jencks Act court decisions to date,
there are some rough interpretative guidelines. Under the Jencks Act,
a statement which contains substantially all of a witness' pretrial
narration is producible. A summary which omits major portions of a
witness' narrative is not producible° but a "substantially verbatim"
statement need not be a word-for-word account of the witness' nar-
rative." The test is satisfied if the statement gives the substance of
a witness' statement in a fairly comprehensive reproduction of the
witness' words, and does not constitute mere fragmentary notes of
the agent"
The issue, in deciding whether a statement is contemporaneously
recorded, will usually narrow to one of measuring the time lapse be-
tween the investigation or pretrial interview and the preparation of
notes based on the interview, and the time lapse between note-making
and the preparation of any report based on the notes." As least one
court has held that the word "contemporaneous" in Section (e) (2) of
the Jencks Act does not mean "simultaneous."" Beyond this pro-
nouncement, no guiding rule has evolved from the cases. Like the
69 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959). In the view of four justices con-
curring separately in that case, not all summaries of witnesses' statements automatically
fall outside of the Jencks Act, as the majority suggested. Id. at 362.
79 United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1958).
71 United States v. Thomas, 282 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1960). See Annot., 5 L. Ed.
2d 1014, 1026-29 (1961).
72 E.g., United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1959).
73 Id. at 675.
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"substantially verbatim" aspect of the Act, each contemporaneous
recording question is decided on its facts."
C. Statements in General Counsel's Possession
1. Scope of Physical Possession.—NLRB rule 102.118 limits producible
statements in unfair-labor-practice cases to those "in possession of
the general counsel."" Section (b) of the Jencks Act limits producible
statements to those "in the possession of the United States." Within
the meaning of both the Jencks Act and the NLRB rule, "possession"
means something more than the immediate possession of the Govern-
ment's attorney at a particular hearing or trial. Otherwise the intent
of the rule and the statute would be defeated." On its face, "possession
of the United States," as used in the Jencks Act, extends to documents
in the possession of any department or agency of the United States,
so that pertinent documents not in the possession of the FBI or the
Justice Department but held by other federal agencies are nonetheless
subject to production if other Jencks Act requirements are met. The
NLRB rule, on the other hand, is limited to documents in the possession
of the agency's General Counsel. On its face it does not extend to other-
wise producible documents in the possession of other agencies of the
federal government. At least one reviewing court has disagreed with
this limitation on the scope of the possession requirement in rule
102.118."
74 See United States v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1958). The court held
that the "contemporaneous recording" test was satisfied where an FBI agent's original
notes, subsequently transcribed, were made while the witness was talking to the agent,
stating: "§T]he statute requires not that the transcription shall be contemporaneous,
but that its recording shall be, as it was. The present statement is, therefore, 'a tran-
scription thereof'—the very words of the statute." Id. at 749. In Lohman v. United
States, 251 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1958), the court held producible an FBI informer's report
on the defendant's attendance at Communist Party meetings, the report having been made
one or two days after the meetings were held. See also Borges v. United States, 270 F.2d
332 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (ten day to one and one half month time lapse).
75 33 Fed. Reg. 9819, 9820 (July 9, 1968) (§ (b)). The second proviso relating to
"postelection" hearings, limits producible documents to those "in possession of any
agent of the Board . . .." Id. (§ (c)). Although this wording differs from its counter-
part in the first proviso, relating to unfair-labor-practice hearings, the effect of the
"possession" requirement in both provisos is the same, since all professional employees
(field examiners and attorneys) in the NLRB's regional offices are agents of the Gen-
eral Counsel. Unlike unfair-labor-practice proceedings, there is no attorney for the Gen-
eral Counsel in postelection hearings. Generally, those participating in postelection
hearings are a union and an employer, one of whom is contesting the outcome of a
representation election, and a "counsel for the regional director," who is an attorney
attached to the regional office in the region where the representation election was held.
The counsel for the regional director does not act as an advocate for either the union
or the employer, but assures that all of the facts required for a decision by the Board
are placed on the record. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1968).
76 Cf. United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 1965); Augenblick v.
United States, 377 F.2d 586, 597-98 (Ct. Cl. 1967).




In Harvey Aluminum (Inc.)" an NLRB trial examiner refused
to order the attorney for the General Counsel to produce statements of
witnesses for the General Counsel which had been taken by agents of
the Department of Labor and the FBI during investigations by those
agencies. The trial examiner also revoked subpoenas duces tecum
directed to the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General seeking
production of those statements, and denied a request that the NLRB
ask the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General to make the
statements available." The NLRB held that the statements were not
in the possession of the General Counsel within the meaning of the
Jencks decision or the Jencks Act 8° A reviewing court in Harvey
Aluminum Inc. v. NLRB81 disagreed. After preliminarily noting that
the Jencks doctrine applies to administrative proceedings, the court
held that the requirements of "justice," "fair play" and "due process"
were not met by limiting the availability of prior statements to those in
the possession of the federal agency conducting the hearing.82 The
court's rationale was significant in its diametric opposition to the
rationale of the NLRB in the decision reviewed that neither the Jencks
case nor the Jencks Act required the result ultimately reached by the
court:
In a criminal prosecution the Department of Justice would
scarcely be heard to say that it was not required to produce
statements otherwise within the rule simply because the
documents rested in the hands of another federal agency,
and we perceive no valid distinction, for this purpose, between
that case and this one.83
Thus, in the view of the court, insofar as the scope of physical posses-
sion of NLRB documents is concerned, rule 102.118 should extend
to all agencies and components of the federal government and not
merely to documents in the "possession of the general counsel" of the
NLRB, as the plain meaning of the NLRB rule clearly contemplates
The Harvey Aluminum court's decision was not based on an interpre-
tation of the NLRB rule, but on a flat disagreement—on the basis
of Jencks requirements—with the rule as written and as applied in
that case. The phrase "possession of the United States," as used in
Sections (a) and (b) of the Jencks Act, appears to assure, on the
28 139 N.L.R.B. 151,51 L.R.R.M. 1288 (1962).
79 The request was based on the provisions of § 11(6) of the NLRA which provides:
"The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the Presi-
dent, shall furnish the Board, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in
their poscescion relating to any matter before the Board." 29 U.S.C. § 161(6) (1964).
80 139 N.L.R.B. at 152, 51 L.R.R.M, at 1290-91.
81 335 F.2d 749, 56 L.R.R.M. 2982 (9th Or. 1964).
82 Id. at 753-54, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2984-85.
83 Id. at 754, 56 L.R.R.M. at 2985.
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basis of fundamental principles, that a producible statement will not
be withheld from a defendant simply because a document sought at
the time of trial is in the possession of another federal agency, which
derives its existence from the same legislative body and is subject
to the ultimate will of the same Chief Executive as the prosecuting
agency. Harvey Aluminum properly extends this requirement to the
NLRB.
2. Legal Possession.—Section (a) of the Jencks Act makes it reason-
ably clear that the Act applies only to statements made "to an agent
of the Government ...." The NLRB Jencks rule refers to "any state-
ment," without limitation as to whom the statement was made. But
the Board has narrowly interpreted this aspect of the rule." A state-
ment taken by the charging party's attorneys' is outside the scope of
the rule," even though it is shown to the attorney for the General
Counsel." This construction of the rule's possession requirement might
easily defeat the rule's purpose, since production could be resisted on
the ground that possession of a statement once obtained was lost before
trial to a third person who was not an agent of the Government. This
is particularly true where the "third person" is the charging party.
The interests of the charging party and the General Counsel in an
unfair-labor-practice proceeding are essentially the same. The attor-
neys for both parties often work together during the preparation and
trial of an unfair-labor-practice case. It is accordingly arguable that
for the limited purposes of production, circumstances might warrant
treating the attorney for the charging party as an agent of, or co-
attorney for, the General Counsel. Recognizing this problem, one court
expressly left open the question whether the rationale of Harvey
Aluminum extends so far as to require the production of statements not
in the possession of the Government but of a private party working in
close harmony with the Government."
It is questionable whether the amendment of the proviso affects
the Board's holding in Cam pco Plastics" and Tidelands Marine
Serv." that the statement of a witness for the General Counsel is not
84 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1964). See United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
85 The charging party may be represented by counsel. 29 C.F.R. 	 102.38 (1968).
86 Tidelands Marine Serv., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 288, 289 n.4, 52 L.R.R.M. 1005,
1007 n.4 (1962), enforced, 338 F.2d 44, 57 L.R.R.M. 2456 (5th Cir. 1964).
Campeo Plastics Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1272, 1273, 1286, 53 L.R.R.M. 1262, 1264
(1963).
88 NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 979 n.4, 64 L.R.R.M.
2210, 2213 n.4 (9th Cir. 1967).
Campco Plastics Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1272, 1273, 1286, 53 L.R.R.M. 1262, 1264
(1963).




producible if the witness' statement was taken by the charging party
and is not in the General Counsel's possession at the time of the hear-
ing. Before the proviso was amended, the rule applied only after a
witness for the General Counsel had testified. Under subsection (b) of
the amended proviso, the rule also applies after a witness for the charg-
ing party has testified. But the section of the rule relating to "posses-
sion of the general counsel" remains unchanged. It remains to be seen
whether the Board will place a different interpretation on the posses-
sion requirement, and, if not, whether courts will approve the Board's
application of the rule.
3. Lost or Missing Statements.—In Campbell v. United States, 9' the
defendants requested production of a statement which a government
witness testified he had signed for an FBI agent. The government
prosecutor told the court that the statement was not in his possession
and that he did not know whether such a statement ever existed.
Neither the defendants' attorney nor the trial judge called to the wit-
ness stand the agent alleged to have taken the statement. In the course
of his own examination of the government witness who had allegedly
signed the statement, the trial judge showed the witness what was
purported to be an FBI report of the witness' interview. On appeal
from the conviction, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred
by not examining sua sponte the agent who allegedly took the state-
ment the witness said he had signed. The case was remanded for a
hearing on the limited questions of the existence of the statement,
whether it was destroyed, and, if so, the circumstances of its destruc-
tion. The Court reasoned that if the interview report shown to the wit-
ness was not the original or a copy of the document the witness said
he signed and the signed paper had been destroyed, the defendants
"might have been denied a statement to which they were entitled under
the [Jencks Act],"' thus requiring that the testimony of the witness
be stricken in accordance with subsection (d) of the statute. Contrary
to what the majority of the Court implied, four concurring justices
stated that "possession" within the meaning of the Jencks Act was
limited to statements in the possession of the United States at the
time of the trial—a view which, if adopted by the courts, would make
it unnecessary for trial judges to inquire into the circumstances sur-
rounding the unavailability of documents sought by defendants during
trials. In the case of documents purposely made unavailable, such as
the statement deliberately destroyed by an FBI agent on the eve of
trial in United States v. Lonardo,93 the failure to determine why a
document was unavailable would result in a clear injustice.
91 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
92 Id. at 98.
95 350 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1965).
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As do the courts in criminal cases, the NLRB examines the cir-
cumstances surrounding the unavailability of documents sought for
production and bases the decision whether to strike testimony because
of noncompliance with Jencks principles on the motive of the party
causing the unavailability. For example, in an NLRB case where
original affidavits were lost before the hearing, a motion to strike the
testimony of the witnesses involved was denied because the General
Counsel in some instances provided originals of later affidavits con-
cerning the subject matter of the lost affidavits. The NLRB affirmed
on the ground of a lack of showing of prejudice, inasmuch as respon-
dents had an opportunity during cross-examination to ascertain from
the witnesses whether the copies supplied were copies of the originals
and whether the new affidavits differed materially from the lost
affidavits.'" A reviewing court enforced the NLRB's order finding the
respondent in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.° 5
 The
court disposed of the lost-affidavit question on a broader ground than
lack of prejudice, by including a "bad faith" test in its reasoning.
[W]here original statements have been lost or destroyed and
no bad faith or prejudice has been shown, as is the case here,
testimony of the witnesses concerned need not be stricken
because original statements cannot be produced. This would
be true even where purported copies could not be supplied."'
D. The Statement's Relationship to the Witness'
Testimony
Under Section (e) of the Jencks Act, statements which are entirely
unrelated to a witness' testimony on direct examination are not pro-
ducible, and statements partially related are producible only to the
extent that they relate to the witness' testimony on direct examina-
tion." The issue arises only if the Government resists production on
that ground.'" In that case, the trial judge is bound to resolve the
question, even to the extent of conducting an ancillary hearing if one
is required.°° The proper test for the trial judge to apply is not whether
04 Dwight-Eubank Rambler, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1433, 59 L.R.R.M. 1326 (1965).
95 NLRB v. Dwight-Eubank Rambler, Inc., 380 F.2d 141, 65 L.R.R.M. 2900 (9th
Cir. 1967). Accord, NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 64 L.R.R.M.
2210 (9th Cir. 1967). See Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 239-44 (1961); Ogden v.
United States, 323 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Tomaiolo, 317 F.2d 324,
327-28 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 856 (1963). But cf. United States v. Lonardo,
350 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1965).
96 NLRB v. Dwight-Eubank Rambler, Inc., 380 F.2d 144, 145, 65 L.R.R.M. 2900,
2903 (9th Cir. 1967). See Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 1, 5, 68 L.R.R.M.
2831, 2834 (3d Cir. 1968).
97 18 	 § 3500(c) (1964).
98 Id.
99 See id. Cf. Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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the material sought is relevant to the substantive issues in the case,
but whether the statement relates generally to the events and activities
described by the witness on direct examination. 100
The Jencks Act contains no explicit language requiring an in
camera inspection by the trial judge to determine whether a statement
sought to be produced qualifies as a statement under section (e). But
in Palermo v. United States, 1" the Supreme Court interpreted the Act
as requiring an in camera determination of that question.
Before the amendment to the proviso, the NLRB Jencks rule,
unlike the Jencks Act, contained no requirement that a producible
statement relate to the witness' testimony on direct examination.
Notwithstanding this omission from the rule, statements not meeting
that test were denied production in NLRB proceedings. 102 Despite
these decisions by the Board, a court reviewing an NLRB order in-
terpreted the rule-literally and held that an affidavit bearing no rela-
tionship to the testimony of the witness who gave the statement was
improperly denied production by an NLRB trial examiner 103 Because
of the silence of the NLRB's Jencks rule on the subject of relevancy,
the court refused to consider sua sponte the relevancy of the statement.
Apparently, the court chose not to apply the principle of law that
an administrative agency's interpretation of its own rules are gen-
erally accepted, unless contrary to a statute or the Constitution ." 4
Further, the decision, if followed, would have resulted in the produc-
tion of privileged statements having no relevancy to the testimony of
the testifying witness, a situation clearly not intended by the Jencks
decision or the Jencks Act. In this respect, subsection (b) of the
amended proviso is clearly consistent with NLRB decisional law and
with Section (e) of the Jencks Act. Unlike the situation which , existed
before the amendment to the proviso, it is now clear what a trial
examiner should do if a statement sought to be produced contains
matters both related and unrelated to a witness' testimony on direct
too Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 740 (9th Cir. 1962).
101 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
102 Holbrook Knitwear, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1 n.1, 67 L.R.R.M. 1406,
1407 (1968); Follet Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. No. 47, at 2 n.3, 65 L.R.R.M. 1102 (1967) ; Bor -
den Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1120, 61 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1966). In one case, the Board's
order provided for a remand to the trial examiner for the purpose of permitting produc-
tion of "any pretrial statements . . . directly related to their testimony in the proceed-
ings." Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 702, 42 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1958) (emphasis
added).
in NLRB v. Borden Co., 392 F.2d 412, 67 L.R.R.M. 2677 (5th Cir. 1968).
104 E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325
U.S. 410, 413, 414 (1945). An agency's interpretation of its own procedural rules would
appear to be a fortiori binding upon a court, particularly where, as in the court's Borden
decision, the interpretation of the rule is consistent with statutory and Constitutional law,
as well as consistent with a statute (Jencks) imposed upon the agency by the courts on
grounds of fundamental fairness.
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examination. On General Counsel's motion, the trial examiner must
excise from the statement any matter not related to the witness' testi-
mony on direct examination.
E. Use of the Obtained Statement
The rules of evidence regarding the admissibility and use of pro-
duced statements are not affected or modified by either the Jencks
Act'°5 or the NLRB's Jencks rule.'" The impeachment value of a
produced statement depends generally upon the nature and degree of
inconsistency or contradiction between a witness' testimony on direct
examination and matters contained in the statement attributable to
the witness.'°7 Notwithstanding its earlier reluctance to apply the
Jencks Act to its proceedings, the NLRB has subsequently held
applicable to its own proceedings, the statement of the Supreme Court
in the Jencks case acknowledging the value of a prior written state-
ment for impeachment purposes.N8 To enable the cross-examiner to
exploit the use of the statement, wide latitude is permitted in cross-
examining a witness on possible inconsistencies, contradictions, ommis-
sions and other matters relating to the produced statement as it bears
on the witness' credibility. Unduly limiting this type of impeachment
cross-examination to the detriment of the cross-examining party may
constitute reversible error.'"
Apart from using a produced statement for impeachment purposes,
narrow limits are placed upon its use. Although the statement may be
read and analyzed prior to and during cross-examination, the NLRB
holds that it may not be copied or permanently retained by the cross-
examining party, unless it is introduced into evidence.11°
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Act which the NLRB has now chosen to adopt in
toto is a criminal statute, the underlying concepts used by the Supreme
Court in deciding the Jencks case, "justice" and "fairness," are very
easily applied to at least some administrative proceedings. They are
particularly applicable to proceedings of an administrative agency
105 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States v. Knox Coal Co.,
347 F.2d 33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Libbi v. United States, 382 U.S. 904
(1965).
106 Cl. Manbeck Baking Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1189-90, 47 L.R.R.M. 1462, 1464
(1961).
107 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
108 Tidelands Marine Sera., Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 261, 263, 45 L.R.R.M. 1299 (1960).
109 NLRB v. Seine Sr Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 64 L.R.R.M. 2210 (9th
Cir. 1967). Cf. NLRB v. Bear Brand Roofing, Inc., 312 F.2d 616, 52 L.R.R.M. 2275 (10th
Cir. 1962).




like the NLRB, which determines whether or not a law has been
violated.'" Facilitating the opportunity to impeach a witness, within
proper bounds, is not merely a benefit to a party accused and opposed
by the Government, but a benefit to those who must find facts and
arrive at conclusions based on those facts. Clearly, if a witness lies or
has an imperfect memory concerning events he describes on the wit-
ness stand, it is in the interests of the fact finder, as well as the re-
spondent, and, indeed, a government interested in fair play in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, that the witness' failing be exposed."'
An administrative agency should certainly be no less interested in
ascertaining the truth than should a court in a criminal proceeding.
In the case of the NLRB, "life and liberty" in the criminal sense
are not at stake in its proceedings, but NLRB proceedings are de-
cidedly more adversary in nature than those administrative proceedings
in which facts are essentially undisputed, where the fact finder's need
to resolve issues of credibility is an infrequent occurrence, and where
no decision is made concerning a violation of a law. The question
whether an employer or union committed unfair labor practices in
violation of the National Labor Relations Act frequently hinges on
an NLRB trial examiner's determination concerning a witness' ability
or willingness to recall certain words or events, whether the words
were uttered or the events took place as described, and, if so, in what
context. The binding nature of a trial examiner's credibility resolutions
compounds the importance of permitting full use of a procedural
device which facilitates testing a witness' credibility."'
111 Although not so stated in the decisions, the courts apparently take this view. In
addition to the NLRB and SACB proceedings a court has held the Jencks principle
applicable to deportation proceedings conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Carlisle v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In 1959, the Federal Trade
Commission, without court compulsion, applied the Jencks principle to its proceedings.
Ernest Mark High, 56 F.T.C. 625 (1959). See Gellhorn, The Treatment Of Confidential
Information By The Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401,
428, 433 (1968).
112 Studies have shown that exposure of willful falsehood is very rarely demonstrated
by cross-examination, and that the most important service of cross-examination is in ex-
posing faults in perception and memory. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 186-88 (1948).
113 The NLRB consistently holds that a trial examiner's credibility resolutions may
not be successfully challenged on appeal unless "a clear preponderance of all the relevant
evidence" shows that such findings were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Prods,, Inc., 91
N.L.R.B. 544, 26 L.R.R.M. 1531 (1950), enforced, 188 F.2d 362, 27 L.R.R.M. 2631 (3d
Cir. 1951). There are exceptions to the rule, but rarely are they successfully invoked.
Some of these are: Credibility resolutions may be overtuned when they are improperly
based on an inconsistency in testimony rather than the demeanor of a witness, R. & R.
Screen Engraving, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 1579, 1582 (1965); Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1198, 56 L.R.R.M. 1381, 1382 (1964); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 142
N.L.R.B. 827, 829 (1963); when the credited witness' testimony is inherently incredible,
A.F. Publicover Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 152, 67 L.R.R.M. 1088 (1968); Braswell Motor
Freight Lines, 107 N.L.R„B. 761, 763-64, 33 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1954); when credibility
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With narrow limits placed upon the circumstances under which
production of pretrial statements may be ordered in criminal cases
and in those administrative proceedings in which the Jencks principle
is applicable, government files are clearly not in danger of being sub-
jected to unreasonable disclosure to the public. The value of Jencks
procedures as an aid in ascertaining truth more than offsets any such
danger.
resolutions have no other basis than the trial examiner's statement that "[Witness "A" 'a]
testimony was more convincing than [Witness "B" '5]," Hotpoint Co., 120 N.L.R.B.
1768, 1771 (1958) ; Erie Dry Goods Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 815, 39 L.R.R.M. 1336
(1957); when a credited witness is inferentially discredited, Teamsters Local 279,
140 N.L.R.B. 164, 165-166, 51 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1962); and when the credited witness'
testimony is substantially contradicted on cross-examination, Midstate Hauling Co., 129
N.L.R.B. 1150, 1153, 47 L.R.R.M. 1150, 1151 (1961).
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